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
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NAPOLEON
AND
AMERICA

Edward L. Andrews





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1801

NAPOLEON

AND

AMERICA

*An Outline of the Relations of the
United States to the Career
and Downfall of Na-
poleon Bonaparte*

BY

EDWARD L. ANDREWS



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PREFACE

It requires some temerity to add to the volume of Napoleonic narrative. But palliation may be pleaded in recent discoveries of Napoleon's own writings. For the first time the world has been enabled to take a comprehensive survey of his mental development—from its initial stages to its stratified judgments.

The psychology of the most practical, of men may now be explored. It introduces us to the struggle of his idealities; to their dissolution before the realities of life, or their permeation of those realities. Historians must now realize that Napoleon was a reader, thinker, and writer, before he became a man of action. From this origin they may develop fresher and truer theories of his epoch. 'Athwart the multitudinous phases of his career, they may perceive when his conceptions dominated the situation, or were moulded by its exigencies.

*and at the same time most on
imaginative*

It has not often been given any man to trans-

PREFACE

mute his thoughts into deeds upon such a colossal scale, and the United States could not avoid the influence of the scholar-soldier. France and America acted and reacted upon each other with dramatic force during the fifteen years between Marengo and Waterloo. While a mere segment of that circle of activities, which encompassed the civilized world for twenty years, is sighted in this American phase of the marvellous legend, yet it possesses historical interest in a much higher degree than we have been accustomed to attribute. The intrinsic attraction of the subject must aid this meagre presentation to the students of America's relations to Napoleonic Europe.

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"If Bonaparte were free in the United States, his gaze over the ocean would be sufficient to agitate the people of the Old World. His presence alone on the American shore of the Atlantic would force Europe to encamp on the opposite shore."

CHATEAUBRIAND.

Napoleon and America

I

Corsica and the American Colonies

THE influence of the United States upon the career of Napoleon Bonaparte has not received the attention that it merits. It presents a consecutive and curious narrative of historical association. It originated in the sympathy which was felt in the American colonies for the Corsican struggles for freedom. The rebellions of this Mediterranean island were practically contemporaneous with our own revolutionary movement, and besides the fellow feeling which was engendered by similar efforts for independence, there were picturesque features in the history of the miniature republic which excited a responsive interest in these agitated provinces. Much of this American sympathy for Corsica was doubtless attributable to the attractive personality of Paoli, her intelligent chieftain, and

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the whilom associate of the youthful Bonapartes.

The glamour which attached to General Paoli was enhanced during his exile in London. He was then an associate of the most notable men of that notable literary epoch—Johnson, Burke, Goldsmith, and Boswell. With such foster-fathers the story of Corsica became the vogue in England, and in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the intellectual pabulum of the colonies was imported from the mother country, this legend soon percolated across the Atlantic and thus became familiar to Boston, New York and Savannah. Its popularity was increased by Boswell's book of his travels in Corsica.

The contest for the independence of the island was continued or renewed at the time when the colonies declared their independence. Paoli had been an intimate associate of General Oglethorpe, and the town of Paoli in Georgia, as well as four other places of the same name in several states of the Union, testify to the enthusiasm in these provinces for the Corsicans and their fortunes. The sympathy which our forefathers felt for the patriotic mountaineers made

our country familiar to Corsicans. And when we passed from the period of legal resistance, to "the shot that was heard round the world," the conquered but unsubdued islanders returned our sympathy with fervour.

The thoughts and actions of the youthful Bonaparte being deeply identified with the struggle of his native land, he naturally looked with interest upon the colossal movement for territorial independence in America. This interest was reflected in expressions emanating from this mere adolescent, furnishing the earliest evidence of the prominent part that this country occupied in his thoughts: "We share the labours of Washington; we enjoy his triumphs; we follow him at a distance of two thousand leagues. His cause is that of humanity."

II

*The Early Surroundings of Bonaparte
Attracted His Interest to American
Affairs*

DURING the youth of Napoleon, the American war was the most important world-event of those days. It had enlisted the stately fleets of France, as well as her finest regiments. The sea-coast of Corsica was a nursery of sailors, and young Bonaparte was a compatriot of Columbus; he belonged to that Italian maritime race that "had given a new world to Castille and Leon." The merest accident, the fact that the complement of aspirants for the French marine was at that time filled, prevented the precocious islander from becoming a midshipman, instead of a sub-lieutenant of artillery: this trend of his inclination enhanced the young scholar's interest in the lands over-sea. While our revolution was still in progress, the observant collegian had reached his fifteenth year. At that time

many of the brilliant personalities of the French army and navy and court—Lauzun and Fersen, d'Estaing and De Grasse, Rochambeau and Lafayette, were still on American soil or in American waters. Benjamin Franklin, the representative American in the world of Paris, was the cynosure of intelligent Frenchmen.

When Di Buona Parte was a gentleman cadet at the military school of Paris, the director of studies was a distinguished officer by the name of Silvestre Valfort, who had accompanied Lafayette to America. This veteran took an intense interest in this favourite pupil, and was fond of recounting to him the campaigns around the Chesapeake. As an antagonist of English domination over his native Corsica, Bonaparte's political feeling was naturally aroused in this contest with the British Empire. And that interest would certainly be redoubled by the story of the Massacre of Paoli, on the forks of the Brandywine. Indeed there was a practical aspect to this voluntary instruction in the methods of American warfare. Only a few months of probation

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separated the King's cadet from participation in the campaigns of Virginia. Lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte would have commanded his battery, under the orders of Washington.

When Bonaparte received his commission in the fall of 1785, the Franco-American alliance and its glorious culmination at Yorktown were still fresh in the recollection of the Parisians. About this time the French regiments returned from their American adventures. His attention would surely be attracted by the decoration of Cincinnatus, which was proudly worn by many of the officers on the Champ de Mars, and as a military student the young subaltern was interested in the recent and admired strategy of "M. de Vashington."

The extent to which America was in the French air at this period is illustrated by the offer of prizes by the Academy of Lyons for the best essay on the question: Has the discovery of America redounded to the benefit or disadvantage of the world? About this time Bonaparte became a competitor for the literary laurels awarded by this same institution.

The course of political events tended to increase his interest in the affairs of this country. The year 1789 brought many changes to France and America. The United States became a Federal Union, and France began to place limitations on her Monarchy. The Bonapartes were double revolutionaries, and there are some indications that Napoleon, the author of a history of Corsica, contemplated following the rebellious example of the English colonies and aspired to found an insular Republic. As the French revolution progressed, and the Bonaparte brothers became identified with the fortunes of the mainland, the United States of America was sought by France as an ally. Indeed, during the Directorate, when Napoleon flowered, our alliance was demanded as a right, a treaty right, and with much justification. Moreover, this country was at that time an inspiration and model for governmental changes, particularly for democracies. Thomas Jefferson and Gouverneur Morris were often consulted by members of the States General and the Ministries. France was for a few years administered like our Confederation, without any

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organic executive—by a single legislative body enforcing its mandates through its own Committees. During this period Napoleon was frequently a resident of Paris, an unattached officer, and as the result proved was a keen observer of the governmental machinery which the French liberals had adopted from their trans-Atlantic prototype. Therefore, from a civil as well as a military point of view, it was natural that his powerful intelligence should at that time have been directed towards the study of American affairs.

III

Bonaparte's Studies in American History During His Garrison Days

THE extent and variety of Napoleon's extra-professional acquirements have long presented a problem. If necessity be the spur to industry, the alien boy arrived in France with the record proof of that requisite.

His admission to the preparatory school of Brienne, as a King's scholar, required the

production of this "certificate of indigence."

"We the undersigned, nobles of the island of Corsica, living at Ajaccio, certify that Charles Bonaparte, although a gentleman, is poor, and cannot give his children the education proportioned to their birth."

June 24th, 1776.

ANNIBALE FOLACCI

PIETRO COLONNA

In the light of subsequent events, this document is the most suggestive of all Napoleonic memorials. In its absence, the young provincial would probably have been deprived of the intellectual vision and the official rank which opened before him the worlds of thought and action. With its possession, he obtained a title-deed to opportunity. During the nine years that he passed in his scientific and professional classes, he was fairly assiduous in his scholastic efforts. But his self-imposed post-graduate studies really account for his extraordinary accomplishments. During seven years after receiving his commission, Bonaparte lived to a great extent in the world of books. With the exception of his volun-

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teer service in Corsica, this period in the life of the impoverished officer was passed in garrison towns, where his inclination, as well as his enforced asceticism, directed his attention to study, and led to his careful analysis of American affairs

His general design seems to have been the acquisition of a knowledge of the actual man, commencing with his natural history and extending through his recorded history from the most ancient period to the days of Louis XVI. In the pursuit of these studies the methodical scientist inscribed memoranda of the points which he deemed noteworthy. In his manuscript synopsis Bonaparte's first reference to America was noted under the date of 1608, as follows: "The Archbishop of Canterbury pursued the Puritans with so much rigour that they commenced to flee to Virginia." As this incident did not present large physical proportions, is it not fair to presume that the student saw its extensive moral aspect—the first departure for the new world of self-exiles for conscience' sake. This speculation receives colour from the paragraphs which precede and

follow the foregoing annotation, as they are both connected with conflicts of public sentiment—the Catholic reaction in England, and the theory of the divine right of kings.

About this time there was published in London a sort of contemporaneous history, called *L'Espion Anglais*—which purported to be a correspondence between *Milord All'eye* and *Milord All'ear*. Lieutenant Bonaparte seems to have been much interested in *The English Spy*, and constructed therefrom some memoranda, incorporating material which he presumably deemed noteworthy and which he desired to recall. His first American entry originating from this publication is margined with the words: "United Provinces of America," and is preceded by the statement that Lord North controlled the cabinet of St. James in 1775. Here is the *verbatim* translation of this outline of American affairs by the studious officer of Bombardiers, aged twenty:

"The English colonies have only about 150 miles of average width, by 800 of length—120,000 square miles of surface. England

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contains in her three kingdoms 205,000 square miles. In 1760 the population was 2,500,000 whites and 450,000 blacks. The population doubles every twenty years, which indicates that it has to-day 4,000,000 of inhabitants.

"Four acres are required to live in France; forty are needed in America.

"There are ten degrees more cold in London than in Boston.

"Northern America is obliged to resort to fishing for sustenance. There is wood for construction, but its distance renders exportation impossible or at least costly. Its commerce of furs is falling; it produces to-day only 35,000 pounds sterling. They have a commerce with the Antilles which is unfavourable to them. They have manufactures, that of Dartmouth among others. The mulberry grows there very well. The cotton plant is large and the fibre very strong. The central part of America cultivates tobacco, but this devouring plant has exhausted the soil.

"In the two Carolinas, Georgia and Florida, there are rice lands; they have already done some commerce in cotton. The fogs and rains prevent the cultivation of the vine."

As an evidence of the special interest which Bonaparte felt in this subject, he mentions that the above account of the productions of America is taken from a letter (apparently addressed to *The English Spy*), which seems to him not to be very exact.

After noting that Deane was the first deputy of the United *Provinces* to Versailles, "Monsieur" Franklin is referred to as a deputy of the United *States*. The recognition of American independence by France, the departure of d'Estaing's fleet from Toulon, the capture of Martinique by the French and of the Miquelon Islands by the English, are duly noted. They are followed by a curious entry to the following effect:

"The Americans have not any esteem for France, which they regard as bound down under the double despotism of the govern-

ment and of the priests, as vile slaves given up to prejudice. The first Frenchmen who went there were men lost by debts."

This statement, which seems to have been written in August, 1788, is somewhat puzzling. Can it be explained by the friction between the French and American governments arising from the course of peace negotiations, aggravated six years later, the time of this entry, by the political excitement existing just before the meeting of the States General?

IV

American Marriage and Associations of the First Consul

WE need not be reminded that Napoleon became the husband of an American wife. After his marriage to Josephine, Bonaparte's interest in American affairs must have been considerably enhanced. He was brought into social relations with the important Franco-American colony resident in Paris, and the dramatic inter-

est of their personal affairs was calculated to attract such a persistent gossip as the First Consul. In conversations at St. Helena, it was to this influence that he attributed his American experiment, to be hereafter described. The brilliant career of his domestic predecessor, as a staff officer serving with the Bourbonnais regiment in Virginia, presented a subject of talks with the Martinique lady and the Beauharnais children. At the head of his military family stood Berthier, whose American exploits were full of merit; and the chief of his civil staff was the inimitable Talleyrand, to whose keen observation all classes in the States had been curiously subjected.

That Bonaparte nourished a pride in the French achievements beyond the Atlantic is indicated by his reception of Rochambeau at the Tuileries. Pointing to the generals surrounding him, he said: "Marshal, here are your scholars."

Almost the first act of civil administration which the First Consul was called upon to perform related to the death of George Washington. He ordered that all the flags and standards of the republican army be draped with crape dur-

ing ten days—"for a great man who struggled against tyranny, whose name is especially dear to the French people, and to all friends of humanity in the two worlds, and particularly to the French as well as the American soldiers, those combatants for liberty and equality." This enunciation may be taken to express Bonaparte's views of the political resemblance between the two countries. It is noticeable that he carefully omits to mention "fraternity" among the subjects of similarity in their political institutions. From his point of view, this language should be taken as an expression of his preference for the measured and conservative fabric of government which then existed in the United States.

The interest which Napoleon felt in this country was particularly noticeable to his contemporaries in connection with his relations to Lafayette. At Joseph Bonaparte's country seat, where they were both visitors, it was observed that the First Consul overwhelmed Lafayette with questions about the United States, and about Washington.

Upon the establishment of the orderly Govern-

ment of the Consulate, many exiles of the Terror and the Directorate returned from America. Among them was Volney, of the Ruins of Empires, who was closely associated with Corsica, and Chateaubriand who had poetized the Western wilds to the point of fashion. The loss of the racy French Colony in Canada was still mourned, and the prospective recovery of Louisiana could logically involve, as of yore, the valley of the St. Lawrence. It was therefore natural that the subsidence of turmoil in European affairs should suggest the diversion of Napoleon's energies to that America which had so often been the subject of his thoughts—in political affairs and through social surroundings.

V

*Napoleon's Attempt to Found a Colonial
Empire in North America*

WITH the opening of the nineteenth century, the academic interest of Napoleon in the New World was to assume a prac-

tical form. He became deliberately engaged in the attempt to found, or to refound, a French empire in America, and when we come to measure his resources at that time, it was by no means the most quixotic of his ventures. The peace of Amiens had left at his disposal for colonial enterprises a great army of veterans—the conquerors of Marengo and Hohenlinden. His navy was still strong and yet unshattered by the disaster of Trafalgar.

In what quarter of the globe were these armies and navies to be utilized? The failure of the Egyptian expedition had terminated with the return of the French garrison, and the base for the establishment of France's Oriental empire was lost. The past and present history of France then united in pointing to America as the scene for her energies. Her West India islands were the sole remnants of her great dominion in the Western Hemisphere. The scheme now developed for its recovery was supported by ample diplomatic and military preparations.

By a secret clause in the convention with Spain in the fall of 1800, she had retroceded to France

the one-quarter of North American territory then known as Louisiana. Beautiful Florence and the Tuscan land, the ancestral home of the Buona-Partes, was deemed by Spain to be the full equivalent for the vast but uncultivated valley of the Mississippi. This Italian province, where Amerigo Vespucci had dwelt, was in the sequel to be the means of dowering us with our greatest territorial extension. Besides this direct arrangement with Spain, Napoleon could count upon the moral, and, if need be, the physical co-operation of the Spanish monarchy, then possessor of the Floridas, and lord paramount of Central and South America.

Indeed, the comprehensive manner in which the entire scheme was conceived is shown by the effort to obtain from Spain the cession of the Floridas, in exchange for the duchy of Parma. With the entire Gulf coast in Napoleonic control, the communication with the French and Spanish Antilles would have been facilitated, by way of Havana. Imperial influence would thus convert the entire coast line from the tip of the Peninsula to the mouths of the Mississippi into a solid mar-

itime base for the inland territory, from New Orleans to the Northwest. Even the commercial system for regulating the relations between these insular and continental dominions was outlined in the orders given to Marshal Victor, who commanded the expedition intended directly for Louisiana.

Public opinion in France sustained the government in its trans-Atlantic enterprise. The French had regarded the cession of Louisiana to Spain, only thirteen years before our Revolutionary War, as the weakest act of the weak administration of Louis XV. The commerce with San Domingo had represented fully half the oceanic traffic of the Kingdom, and the recovery of the island was ardently desired by merchants and consumers of France as well as by Dominican planters.

The relations of the United States to the territorial changes contemplated were considered at length in a semi-official pamphlet published at Paris. It was conceded that our government might take umbrage at the cession of the trans-Mississippi, whereby the strongest military power of the world would be substituted as our neigh-

bour for one of the weakest. But the pamphleteer stood boldly on the ground that this republic was not able to oppose any formidable resistance—that its seaboard cities were exposed, that its navy was a negligible quantity, and finally that we were lacking in the spirit as well as the resources necessary to antagonize the Consular forces.

The military and naval equipment for establishing this colonial empire was adequate for the purpose. The expedition to San Domingo comprised sixty-three ships of the line and frigates, carrying more than 20,000 troops; and with the reinforcements sent to Guadaloupe and the other islands, fully 80,000 French soldiers were landed in those tropical latitudes. The greatest single force mustered by the British on American soil at any single period of the Revolutionary War did not exceed those figures. Washington never had more than 17,000 effectives under his command, and at Yorktown Cornwallis surrendered only 7,000 men. Merely for the suppression of the island rebellions, the numbers of the French contingents must have seemed unduly

large. Even for an army of occupation of the Orleans territory, it was ample by comparison with other European expeditions to America. In addition, forces were assembled at Dunkirk to proceed direct to the Mississippi in case the growing opposition at Washington assumed a hostile form.

But before this auxiliary corps set sail, the courage of the Dominicans and the ravages of yellow fever depleted the battalions recently arrived in the West Indies, fresh from the Rhine. The Napoleonic idea of a new France encircling the Caribbean was soon realized by its creator to be a mere illusion, which he finally dispelled by his own hand in the sale of Louisiana. Our country, was thus saved by San Domingo from the necessity of dealing with a great European military and civil dominion on our Mississippi border.

From a military as well as an industrial aspect, the French expedition should have been landed at New Orleans instead of Gonaives. The climate and the conditions of the black population were there much more favourable to the French armies than in the Antilles.

Not more than five hundred thousand inhabitants were under our flag between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi; Nashville was the furthest outpost on the southwest. With the French mainland, held by the fifty thousand disposable troops, on the way from Europe, it would have afforded the true base for the new France in America. With this protection Pauline Bonaparte might have been safely installed as Queen of Louisiana.

There is a phase of this historical episode which we should not readily forget. From the *Memoirs* of Montholon it appears that the original idea of administering the enterprise was to enlist a body of 25,000 blacks for service in Louisiana. Of course this scheme assumed the easy conquest of San Domingo, and with this base of operations and the utilization of the coloured population on all the islands, the French mainland could have been strongly held from a military point of view without requiring heavy drafts upon Brest or Toulon.

This army of l'Ouvertures and Dessalines would have been placed face to face with a slave

population extending from Georgia to New Jersey. But thanks to negro bravery, San Domingo remained independent, and we were saved the spectacle of hordes of coloured Hessians upon our western boundary. Thus ended Napoleon's affirmative action in reference to American soil. Instead of Gallicizing the valley of the Mississippi, he obtained an argosy from the sale of Louisiana which aided him at Ulm and Austerlitz in the conquest of the Holy Roman Empire—thereby transferring his subversive energies from the youngest republic to the oldest monarchy.

VI

Polygamy as Napoleon's Antidote to Slavery in America

AS a part of the administration of his Franco-American empire, Napoleon's proposed solution of the great problem of slavery should not be passed over; it illustrates the practical tone of his mind. At the time of the Louisiana purchase, trading in slaves was still the constitutional right

of every citizen of the United States, though it had been abolished in the French West Indies. Nevertheless the Consul's suggestion indicates the great distance which a century has interposed in the outlook upon some other elemental questions of society.

In short, Napoleon suggested to the Bishop of Mantes that polygamy be utilized to countervail slavery. He had noticed that in Eastern countries there was a strange impartiality of favours in the administration of polygamy. In Egypt, the legitimate allotment of Mohammedan wives was graduated through all the tints of the palette and plus. This cosmopolitan rule in the harem suggested to the impromptu legislator an unprejudiced reform. He argued that this variegated miscegenation in the Orient had softened the prejudices among races in that part of the world, and had accomplished much in reducing tribal enmities that had prevailed during the ante-Mohammedan period. Why should not this system aid in abolishing slavery in the West Indies and Louisiana? As legality of association was a requisite of the plan, the great Executive at once

demanding approval from a Church dignitary. The argument seemed to the Consul to be based on correct principles of sociology: as modern slavery was identified with a difference of colour, how could the people of the ruling complexion keep their own relatives in bondage? Plural marriage he proposed to utilize for the gradual dissolution of the practice of treating alien races as chattels. As the approval of the episcopacy could not be obtained, the plan of fighting one legalized wrong with another was perforce withdrawn. Perhaps in the Philippines we are now incontinently testing this same proposition.

VII

Napoleon's Plans for the Conquest of Canada were Obstructed by Opposi- tion in This Country

THE idea of reëstablishing a firm French footing on this Continent became almost an obsession in the mind of Napoleon. After all his manœuvring with Spain to acquire Louisiana,

the necessities of his military and financial situation had forced him to part with that immense territory. But after his great victories at Austerlitz and Jena over three military empires of Europe, he felt that he might safely revert to plans for a dominion in North America. This time he necessarily turned to the valley of the St. Lawrence, and to the considerable French population that inhabited those provinces from Nova Scotia to the Great Lakes. It will be remembered that about this time there was much disaffection among the habitants around Quebec and about the Ontario waters; a price had been put on the head of Taschereau, the Canadian leader.

Under these circumstances, the management of the preliminary intriguing was placed in Talleyrand's hands. The French Minister at Washington, General Turreau, arranged for a meeting with the Canadian agents. A sturdy chief bearing the significant name of Gros Pin, came with his associates to the village of Newark in New Jersey to confer with the representatives of France, as Washington City was deemed too non-secretive. This interview was followed by

the mission of Le Blond St. Hilaire, a Count of the Empire, who was selected for the dangerous task because of his large family connection in the Canadas. At the time of the Austrian marriage these American plans of the conqueror of Europe were fully matured—in the archives of foreign affairs at Paris.

But hesitation and delay ensued, and that change in the situation was caused by the state of feeling in the United States. The sentiment of the American people was at that period peculiarly hostile to the French Canadians. We are all acquainted with the angry disappointment during our Revolution that French Canada had not united with us in rejecting the English armies. Moreover, this sentiment had been intensified by the aid given Burgoyne and other British generals by the *voyageurs* and their Indian allies, and their attacks on our near-frontier settlements. This antagonism had developed on this side of the line into such "positive hatred" that Napoleon's agents became apprehensive of the opposition of this Government to any effort in the interest of our Gallic neighbours. The proj-

ect was then allowed to drift until the preparations for the Russian campaign placed it in the background.

VIII

Napoleon Rejects the Scheme of an Anglo-French Alliance Against the United States

IN 1810 Napoleon was at the zenith of his power. With the exception of Lisbon, he dominated every capital on the continent by force or prestige. His irresistible empire had recently been illustrated by his marriage with the niece of Marie Antoinette. The principal antagonist of this vast dominion was still the British crown. It was this situation of European affairs which suggested the strangest of expedients to one of the most fertile minds of France. The imperial Minister of Police did not yield in influence or ambition to any of the Emperor's officials. His resources for dealing with a problem of state are evidenced by the arguments which he propounded to the confidants of his surreptitious scheme

against this country. As war and conquest had accomplished almost final results for the Napoleonic fortunes, he thought that the concluding act must be sought by some great stroke of pacific policy. Between maritime England and the land power of France there seemed no prospect of early success for either combatant. Fouché foresaw a great triumph for the statesman who could terminate this hopeless antagonism, who could bring together the world's great rivals. But what materials were available to effect this difficult pacification? Napoleon had already evinced his unwillingness to concede an iota of his European positions or claims. The solution must be sought elsewhere.

While England could not offer the triumphant Emperor any considerations in the Old World, the total failure of Napoleon's career had lain in the direction of colonial enterprises, Egypt on one side, Louisiana on the other. His position now seemed hopeless in this line of action. Could the Duke of Otranto gratify this imperial longing—could he secure a great transmarine outlet for French arms and arts? Could he at the same

time restore peace to wearied Europe? If by one supreme diplomatic stroke he could accomplish both these results, Joseph Fouché would become the most notable figure; from a Minister of Police he would rise in rank to the highest grade and to the most brilliant rewards of statesmanship.

At this time the relations between the United States and England were strained to a hostile point—by searches of our vessels and impressment of our seamen, with retaliation on the American side through embargoes and non-intercourse. This phase of the international situation suggested a clue. Why should not the English and French empires join hands to repossess themselves of North America? As unscrupulous and audacious to the point of absurdity as the design may now seem to us, we must place ourselves in the position of the designers to obtain a fair estimate of their scheme. Substantially the military strength of Western and Central Europe would have been arrayed against us. The naval force would be mainly supplied by England, with some assistance from Holland and France. The victorious armies of the Empire

would furnish the land forces. On the North, England was in possession of Canada, and in the South, Spain held Florida, while Louisiana, in the seven years since the purchase, still remained more French than American—so that we were really surrounded on three sides by hostile territory. When we now recall some unpleasant incidents which happened near the St. Lawrence and the Potomac only two years afterward, when England stood alone against us, the proposed combination of 1810 must be regarded in its physical proportions, as the most formidable that ever threatened us. Instead of French by our side fighting England and the Hessians, we should have found arrayed against us the two Great Powers, with Hessian and other contingents, willing or unwilling.

The foregoing are some of the public aspects of the subject. In reality they merely furnished the foundation for a most remarkable political intrigue. The success of the ruse depended upon its concealment from the Emperor. His own cabinet minister, who should have been one of the most confidential, conceived the plan of thus

diplomatizing with his principal enemy, without his knowledge. Fouché knew that Napoleon would not become a participant in the initial stages of such a parley, whereby America, a formidable neutral, was to be made the victim of the joint covetousness. But he did calculate that the British ministry might be committed to the scheme, that the supereminent advantages to the peace and commerce of the Old World would then become apparent to the Emperor, and that he would not at that late stage object to dividing the United States with his new ally. Secrecy in the process of reaching some species of unofficial but compromising transactions across the Channel was therefore of the essence of the adventure.

It so happened that about that time Louis Bonaparte, the King of Holland, had induced the Emperor to permit some negotiations with England, to be based entirely on European territorial and commercial arrangements. Fouché seized upon this situation as a cover for the prosecution of his plot. His method was to coincide ostensibly with the special plans of the Bonaparte brothers but he would select the agents

through whom the pourparlers with England should transpire. While the men on the thrones might indicate the bases of peace, Fouché would control the emissaries who transmitted the real terms and their expression between Paris and London.

The principal intermediary chosen by Fouché as his unwitting instrument was the well-known banker of Amsterdam, Labouchère. He possessed ready means of access to the British ministry through his father-in-law, the head of the house of Baring. His nationality as a Dutchman, a quasi-neutral, made his selection particularly favourable to non-committal. Napoleon was willing that Labouchère should visit England as an agent of the Dutch ministry and should "sound the English ministry upon their views concerning the basis of peace." But Labouchère knew only Fouché and took his instructions from him alone, or under his orders. These instructions consisted in a proposed joint operation against North America. Mexico was to be erected into a kingdom for Ferdinand of Spain, Louis XVIII was to become a monarch

in the trans-Mississippi, and England and France were to partition the United States and Canada. From beginning to end of these clandestine directions to Labouchère and his other emissaries, Fouché impressed them with the belief that he was merely reflecting the Emperor's ideas. And naturally no one suspected that he was proffering such officious schemes of alliance, upon his own initiative. In any event Labouchère crept to London via Amsterdam, and repeated the Fouché communications to Baring, and the latter in turn conversed upon the same lines with the Marquis of Wellesley, a member of the English government. The Marquis conferred with his colleague, Canning, in reference to the proposed conditions; "and for eight days there were long, frequent, and sufficiently conclusive interviews between the foreign office and Baring." They crystallized into a tacit understanding that the conquest of the American Republic was a proper subject of arrangement. So cunningly was the imbroglio managed that all the envoys thought that they were treating with the dictator of the continent, when they were

actually being puppetted by Monsieur Joseph Fouché, the author and exploiter of this American scheme.

By the merest accident, the whole "castle in Spain" came tumbling to the ground. Napoleon was visiting Antwerp, when, in conversation with King Louis, his brother remarked that he had just left one of the agents of "the great negotiation," who was going to Paris to receive further instructions from the Duke of Otranto. The Emperor was surprised. He had not heard of any negotiations for a month and those with which he was acquainted, he supposed were buried. At once Labouchère was required to surrender all his correspondence, and so thoroughly was he a believer in Fouché's authority to act for the Emperor, that he did not withhold any of his papers, supposing that Napoleon merely wished to refresh his recollection. Upon these disclosures, the imperial thunderbolts fell fast and furious. Ouvrard, the great financial contractor and associate of Fouché in the scheme, was incarcerated in Vincennes. The seizure of his papers proved that Fouché had manœuvred

so skilfully that even Ouvrard, his intimate, thought that the Emperor was behind the colossal plan for the partition of America; thereupon he had indoctrinated Labouchère; he in turn convinced Baring, who satisfied the Ministers of the Crown. In a few days more a secret document would have embodied the most audacious, and from some aspects, the most dangerous attack on the integrity of the American Republic.

Fouché was absent from the next Council of State at St. Cloud; but Napoleon summed up the situation in these words:

“What would you think of a Minister, who, abusing his position, had, without the knowledge of his sovereign, opened communications with the stranger, started diplomatic negotiations on bases imagined by him alone, and thus compromised the policy of the State? What punishment is there provided in our Codes for such a crime?” Strange to say, such was the occult influence of Fouché, that not one of his co-Councillors ventured to express himself in favour of his dismissal. Only Talleyrand said in a stage whisper to his neighbour at the board: “Without

doubt, Fouché has acted wrongly; and for my part, I would substitute another official, but one alone, M. Fouché himself."

But Napoleon did not coincide with this view. He dismissed the Minister of Police. The Emperor did indeed testify, "to the purity of his intentions but declined to admit them as justifying the dangers to my tranquillity and that of my state." So Fouché's power ceased and the possibility of an American Poland became a curiosity of history.

IX

The Operations of the United States Merchant Marine Become the Proximate Cause of the Invasion of Russia

THE scene of American relations with Napoleon and influence upon his destinies now shifts to the European side of the Atlantic. At the risk of a seeming paradox, we will endeavour to show that the United States was the indirect cause of Napoleon's downfall. There is only one premise which must be conceded as a preliminary

to this conclusion; that the invasion of Russia was the proximate impulse to the reversal of the imperial *régime*. With this concession made, we have merely to indicate the part which our country played in bringing about the conflict between France and Russia. From this statement it will appear that though an American army has never trod the soil of Europe, the peaceful influence of the stars and stripes has been potent enough to dissolve the greatest of European alliances, followed by the most tragic discomfiture of modern times.

The pivot of the European situation between 1810 and 1812 was the commercial, or rather the anti-commercial, warfare familiarly known as the Continental system. This was Napoleon's plan of inland blockade, whereby he endeavoured to close all the ports of the European mainland, from the Levant around to the Baltic, to the importation of all sorts of British products. It must be remembered that England was then master of the East and West Indies, so that the major portions of the world's tropical resources, such as sugar, tea, coffee, indigo, and dye stuffs,

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were grown in her territories. By means of her recent application of steam to mechanical devices, Britain had become the world's cheapest producer of cotton and woollen manufactures. The immense population of the European continent, with its numerous wealthy classes, was naturally the best customer of commercial England. This backbone of the world's traffic Napoleon proposed to sever by the military occupation of the great seaports on the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the Baltic. When the French troops did not occupy the coast line, diplomatic alliances were depended upon to accomplish a similar result. The latest ally to be brought into this Continental system was the Russian Empire, and the prime service which Alexander was expected to render his great and good brother at Paris was the closing of the Baltic harbours to the ingress of every fibre and spoonful of anything English, or suspected of being English. By this method the "shopkeepers" on the other side of the Channel were to be starved into submission.

Besides sealing the ports of the Continent to English ships, as far as possible, the complete

success of the plan required the prevention of the carriage of British goods by the ships of other nations and their eventual delivery at some point on the prohibited seaboard. The prohibited traffic in the ships of France, of her viceregal kingdoms, such as Holland, Italy, and Spain, or of her allies, Prussia and Austria, was more or less easily prevented. These nations were real or nominal parties to the great struggle then being waged for the suzerainty of Europe, and in this way the mercantile marines of the old continent were, through the political relations of their governments, theoretically excluded from carrying English goods. With the exception of smuggling, there seemed no outlet for English industry, and in 1811 Lancashire was suffering nearly as much from the loss of markets for its finished products as it suffered fifty years later for want of the raw material.

At this time the United States, a nation only twenty years old, developed a mercantile marine which was destined to affect the fate of nations. In 1810 the registered capacity of the American ships was nearly 1,500,000 tons. It is unneces-

sary to repeat the well-known facts concerning the speed of American "clippers" and the seamanlike qualities of the American sailor, in those days of our flourishing shipping.

They are thus described in a dispatch of M. Serrurier, the French minister at Washington:

"The Americans possess a sort of vessels called schooners, the swiftest in the world, and for that reason beyond insult and capture; while their sailors are full of confidence in the advantage given by this sort of vessel in time of war."

These American "skippers" penetrated the harbours of the world from Riga to Singapore. Now be it remembered that being controllers of this great floating industry, we were also the principal neutral nation of the world, in the midst of belligerents, each of them endeavouring to destroy the commerce of the other.

It is difficult at this time to convey an accurate notion of the diminished status of neutrals or rather of *the* neutral, our country, in face of a world in arms. To paraphrase a well-known judicial statement: Neutrals had no rights which

belligerents were bound to respect. Nevertheless, as a neutral power and under its commercial treaties, the United States was entitled to trade freely with the belligerent powers, unless their harbours were blockaded. As a matter of fact there was no naval blockade by France or her allies. Napoleon's plan was to close the ports of Europe from the land side.

Under these circumstances we claimed the right to sail our flag into every port not closed according to the law of nations, and to carry under that flag any of the world's commercial products. As the English flag was shut out from the greater part of the Continent as belligerent, and was safe from privateers only under convoy, from a practical point we should have been large beneficiaries by this colossal strife, and at the same time should have been within our neutral rights. In the sequel it will appear that our captains and supercargoes were not slow in availing themselves of these favourable trade opportunities.

But meanwhile we were obliged to contend with the *régime* of might, represented by Napoleon's announcement in his famous Berlin and

Milan decrees that he would confiscate every American ship wherever found, which was laden with goods of English origin, and would close all ports under his control to every American ship that had touched the English coast.

The consequences of this policy were evidenced on New Year's Day, 1812, when President Madison said at the diplomatic reception that it was distressing to learn what was passing every day on the Baltic and on the waters from America to England, as some American ships were burned, while others were captured by privateers, taken into European ports under French influence, and there condemned.

In view of this violent course towards a peaceful neutral, we can better appreciate the subsequent hostilities to which Napoleon resorted against his Russian ally, to prevent access by our shipping to the Baltic harbours. Through victories and treaties the Emperor felt that he had substantially succeeded in his colossal coast system. The closing of the Muscovite ports was to be the final rounding of the great circle of maritime exclusion. As he expressed it: "Not even

a *Milord Anglais* could land on the Continent unless he came in a French ship."

Just as this cordon was about completed, the Yankee fleets sailed through its gaps—so successfully that Napoleon was driven to the last resort of endeavouring to occupy the Russian coast by force of arms. The conditions which brought about this result may be briefly recalled.

The Baltic was at that time more important in the scale of comparative commerce than at the present time. From its shores the main exports of the Empire had been shipped; such as timber, hemp, and grain. The imports by this channel had consisted of tropical growths and English fabrics. The carriers of this commerce had been almost exclusively English vessels. But in 1811 few British merchantmen visited these waters, from fear that any goods landed by them would be seized or destroyed under Napoleon's decrees. As the result of the interference with this northern commerce, the Russian rouble had fallen about twenty-five per cent.

At last the Czar determined to relieve his subjects from this burdensome condition, and by an

imperial ukase he endeavoured to withdraw from the state of commercial belligerency. Alexander alleged that he intended to continue the exclusion of English goods and to admit only American wares—which he claimed did not conflict with his obligations under the treaty of Tilsit. Thereupon American vessels swarmed in Russian ports, supplying the sugar, coffee and manufactures required by the Muscovites and creating a demand for their naval stores and cereals. In short, America soon enjoyed a practical monopoly of the Baltic trade, and to add to Napoleon's irritation, the goods which our ships delivered at Riga or Archangel were distributed all over the Continent, and thus through this open gate the Continental system was being overthrown and English goods re-admitted to the markets of Europe.

How did the French Emperor meet this thwarting of his policy? The foundation of his course with Russia was to treat the American ships just as if they were British. Napoleon declared:

“The English allow the Americans to navigate so far as they carry English mer-

chandise and sail on English account. Not a single American vessel has entered the ports of Russia with so-called American papers, which has not really come from England."

It must be conceded that there was probably a substratum of fact in these charges; but as we were not accountable to Napoleon for the manner or matter of our legal trade as a neutral with England and Russia, the charges amounted merely to a discussion between Napoleon and his Russian ally.

But in spite of these Napoleonic utterances, the Czar refused to shut his coasts to American vessels or their cargoes. Alexander said to Caulaincourt: "In fact I cannot, as I have already told you, prohibit all commerce to my subjects, or forbid them to deal with the Americans."

It must not be supposed that our vessels had clear sailing in their promotion of this international traffic; the Danes were almost piratical in their captures of our bottoms, and along the North German coast we suffered frequent disasters. But our sailors "throve under pillage and

challenged confiscation." With scores of our schooners in Russian harbours clamouring for permission to discharge before they were blockaded by the ice, the St. Petersburg officials determined to receive the needed woollen cloths and other goods, even if close scrutiny would have disclosed their English origin.

In face of these breaches of his Continental system, Napoleon concluded that the complete domination of Russia must precede the commercial ruin and consequent submission of England. Hence the great invasion of 1812. Whether the outcome might not have resulted from some other cause, the fact remains that the presence of our neutral fleets provided the Czar with a means of relieving the commercial necessities of his Empire, and his resort to that relief provoked the French invasion. In short, the performances and ubiquity of our merchant cruisers furnished the weapon which severed the Continental system. The retreat from Moscow gave it the final stroke, and was itself the beginning of the end of the Napoleonic Empire.

X

*Our War of 1812 Should Have Averted
the Conflict Between France and
Russia*

AS our neutral commerce was the instrumentality that occasioned Napoleon's attempt to dominate Russia, our conversion into the character of a belligerent nation should have obviated the need of hostilities between Paris and St. Petersburg.

It so happened that our war of 1812 and the invasion of Russia coincided in point of time. In this concurrence of events, in the month of June of that year, something of the irony of history is involved. If the news of our declaration of hostilities against England had reached Paris before the French crossed the Niemen, there is much probability that Napoleon would not have proceeded to war with the Czar.

This opinion is predicated on the change which ensued from a state of war between England and the United States, in the position of our merchant

marine as a carrier of English goods. Trade between us and the British Empire ceased with the condition of warfare, and this change was accentuated by the fact that the contest was largely maritime and over the four seas. Under this severance of relations, our shipping could not have continued as the intermediary of trade between England and her colonies on the one part, and the ports of Russia on the other. With this cessation of the transportation between those two countries in American bottoms, English products would not have found their outlet in the Baltic. Thereupon, the incentive for hostility between the two great continental empires would have expired simply from the inability of Russia to obtain English supplies in our ships, which had become belligerent in respect to England.

This view is strengthened by the fact that when we had theretofore laid an embargo on our shipping, preventing its egress from home ports, Napoleon was pleased to help us in its stringent execution. Indeed he did capture and confiscate many of our vessels on the ground that they were sailing in violation of our own embargo. The

logic of this situation is apparent when we consider that our governmental prevention of the sailing of our vessels deprived England and the purchasers of her merchandise of the services of our neutral shipping. In 1812 the same practical result supervened from the state of hostilities between this country and England.

Therefore if Napoleon had waited a little longer, he would have achieved the same result from the inertia of our merchantmen that he hoped to achieve from the invasion of Russia—the closing of the Baltic ports to English products. But the Emperor was on the march to Moscow before these effects of the Anglo-American war had transpired. He thus prevented us from inadvertently saving him from the destruction to which he was rushing.

XI

Napoleon Expected That the United States Would Become a Powerful Maritime Ally of France

THE development of the maritime strength of this country is woven in the thread of Napoleonic history. Bonaparte realized that our immense coast line and our consequent aptitude for seafaring adapted us for becoming a great power on the high seas.

As we had availed ourselves of these advantages to develop a considerable merchant marine, it became evident that we could also exercise a proportionate military power on the ocean. Napoleon considered that the cession of Louisiana should aid us in this development—would enable us to utilize the gulf coast as a base and to benefit by the timber resources of the littoral:

“To emancipate nations from the commercial tyranny of England, it is necessary to balance her influence by a maritime power that may one day become her rival. When

the United States becomes more powerful, it will rival England with her marine. I attempted to do it but failed."

After the disasters of Aboukir and Trafalgar, after the destruction of the Danish navy, and Holland's loss of her colonies, the United States was the most prominent naval competitor of the British Empire. In this situation Napoleon became impatient and insistent that we should antagonize the English naval policy, should resist the claim to search our vessels, "should hold our flag high," as he urged upon our Ministers to Paris.

When we did finally array ourselves single handed against the Leviathan of the seas, Napoleon welcomed that rivalry in an address to the Corps Législatif:

"America has had recourse to war in order to enforce respect to her flag. The good wishes of the world are hers in this glorious contest. If this contest ends by obliging the enemies of the Continent to recognize that the flag covers the merchandise and the equipage, and that neutrals ought not to

submit to a paper blockade, America will have deserved well of all nations. Posterity will say that the Old World has lost its rights and the New World has recovered them."

In the light of our naval success, it seemed that the Emperor's prevision of our increasing strength on the ocean had been amply justified. It is therefore easy to understand that our second war with England enlisted his liveliest interest. During the trying years of Dresden, Leipsic, and the campaign of France, the United States was the single civilized country which was not arrayed against him. Of all the nations not under Napoleon's domination, our America was the sole antagonist of his persistent enemy. Our naval victories resounded joyfully in the Tuileries. Finally even the note of alliance was struck when the Emperor said: "If Madison had asked for some ships of the line, he should have had them, if he had sent over the sailors to man them."

At Elba, visitors were plied with questions about our enterprising frigates, and from this small principality on the Italian coast, we were

proclaimed by the fallen hero as the champions of the freedom of the seas. But in the sequel England made peace with us too soon for the imperial interest.

XII

Napoleon's First Abdication Enabled England to Attempt the Conquest of Louisiana

WHEN the Emperor's diminished forces were overwhelmed in 1814 by the armies of combined Europe and the capitulation of Paris was followed by the exile to Elba, England was enabled to dispose of large contingents of troops. These circumstances favoured the expedition to New Orleans. This attack in the Mississippi Valley portended a considerable scope of action. Until 1763 France had encircled the English colonies by her provinces extending from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi Valley and the Gulf of Mexico. This great French America had but partly fallen to England by the conquest

of Canada. The vast country to the west of the Mississippi was then ceded by France to Spain. By Napoleon's transfer of Louisiana to the United States it had again eluded the grasp of England. The fall of the Empire presented another opportunity to round out the English dominion, by subjecting the valley of the Mississippi to the same flag that controlled the Canadian provinces. If the Greater Louisiana could be wrested from its recent purchaser, an Anglo-American Empire would extend from Newfoundland to the far West, from the head waters of the Mississippi to the borders of Texas. England would thus fully substitute herself for France, as the greatest proprietor on the North American continent.

These potent results were involved in the attack on New Orleans, and they were all rendered possible by Napoleon's enforced departure for Elba and the release of Wellington's army from service in Spain. The controlling object of Napoleon in making the Louisiana transfer to the United States—to prevent its acquisition by England—was again endangered. But the success

of Andrew Jackson was not a mere local victory; it became the final confirmation of our possession of the trans-Mississippi.

XIII

Fouché Proposes an American Refuge to the King of Elba

PERHAPS the first suggestion to Napoleon of a flight to America emanated from that arch-intriguer, Fouché. During the stay at Elba, he wrote to the ex-Emperor that the Congress of Vienna was deliberating about his deportation to some distant island in the tropics—that it would be the part of discretion to flee from Europe to the United States. It was indeed the fact that many prominent personages on the Continent were apprehensive concerning the proximity of the sovereign of Elba; and none was more desirous of extending the distance between France and Napoleon than his former Minister of Police. It was a shrewd device to

suggest a voyage to America as an alternative to enforced transportation to some kind of Botany Bay. Once beyond the Atlantic, the conqueror would cease to be a menace to the alliance of kings, and to former treacherous ministers, like Fouché. But the Little Corsican had read the works of Machiavelli, and he knew that the Duke of Otranto was a student of the same philosophy. Besides he was advised of the favourable conditions which the Bourbons had inadvertently prepared for him in France. Therefore, and just at that time, he preferred an unopposed march to Paris to an uncertain voyage to New York.

XIV

The English Expedition to New Orleans Contributed to the Return from Elba

THE diminution of the English forces in Europe by their transfer to America, excited keen interest in the Elban capital. This estimate of the bearing of the expedition related as much to its quality as to its numbers, composed

as it was of those Peninsular veterans that had defeated the finest imperial troops.

In this connection there was a peculiarly significant conversation with the British Commissioner at Porto Ferrajo:

"When I informed him that some regiments were about to be sent to America, he inquired whether it was intended to conquer a part of the American States. He was extremely inquisitive as to the force sent to America. When Captain Usher told him that 25,000 men were sent from Lord Wellington's army, and that the Americans had lost in him their best friend, he asked whether it was intended to subjugate them entirely, for such a force could not be meant only to oblige them to make peace. He again expressed his opinion that our Ministers intended to take Louisiana and Florida."

Napoleon was watching and weighing the effect of this great detachment of military strength. He was counting upon its moral as well as its material influence upon England's position in Europe; upon her financial strength as a subsidizer, and upon her political weight at the ses-

sions of the European Congress. The news of the battle of New Orleans would have naturally become the signal for his return to France, as soon as concurring events in Europe should mature. But at this point still another fatality intervened to prevent the United States from assisting, voluntarily or involuntarily, in the maintenance of the Napoleonic Empire. Our war with England terminated just a few weeks too soon to contribute to that purpose.

It is curious to follow the succession of events which connected this country with the final catastrophe. In the fall of 1814, the expedition sailed for America. Wellington, then at Paris, refused the command on the ground that such petty warfare was beneath his dignity; and his brother-in-law, Sir Edward Pakenham, commanded the forces that were defeated on the 8th of January, 1815. The opportune moment for Napoleon's landing in France seemed really now at hand and the departure from Elba took place on February 28th. But as soon as Napoleon reached Paris, the peace which England had made with this country was at once utilized. "There was

hurrying to and fro," between London and America, to effect the return of the veterans of New Orleans, and to countermand the dispatch of regiments that had been ordered to the United States, so that they might be in time to participate in the defence of Belgium. If some bodies of this infantry had been detained a few days longer from the Continent, the plains of Waterloo might have witnessed a different result.

XV

The Ex-Emperor Prepares to Reside in the United States

THAT the great captain nearly became a denizen of the United States is familiar history. It appears from his own words that such was his intention:

"I will go to the United States; they will give me lands or I will purchase some and cultivate them. I will end where man began. I will live on the produce of the earth and my flocks." "But do you think the English would allow you to cultivate your fields



in peace?" "Why not? What harm should I do them?" "What harm? Why, you would perhaps be less dangerous on the degraded throne of Louis XVIII than you might be in the United States. The Americans love and admire you. You might prompt them to enterprises fatal to England."

Napoleon interposed: "What enterprises? The English know well that the Americans would allow themselves to be killed in defence of their native soil, but they do not like to enter upon warlike enterprises abroad."

After Waterloo, the opportunity was afforded him to sail from Bordeaux under the stars and stripes, and from the record of seamanship held by the captain of the hospitable American merchantman, there was every prospect of avoiding the English men-of-war. At this time his brother Joseph offered to take his place, as an invalid, and thus to enable Napoleon to avail himself of the preparations which Joseph had effected for his own departure, including a passport obtained through our *Chargé* in Paris. Napoleon replied:

After

“Your plans are well arranged, you will arrive without difficulty. But I cannot accept your proposition; it would be a flight; and I could not leave without these officers who are devoted to me. You can do it, you are not in my position. I cannot. You will arrive at your haven. Allez.”

Upon a point of honour and dignity Napoleon refused to be a fugitive. In effect, he would have reached New York in thirty-four days, as his brother Joseph succeeded in doing. As the ex-King of Spain landed at Brooklyn, the Northumberland was passing the Canaries with the Great Captive.

XVI

Waterloo Occasioned the Establishment of French Colonies in the United States

BETWEEN 1815 and 1848 several regiments of the Imperial Guards and some battalions of the line could have responded to roll call between the North River and the Rio Grande.

Their complement of officers in this country was more than adequate. The bitterness of Bourbon vengeance for the welcome on the return from Elba had driven some of the finest blood of France from its native soil. The treatment which had been meted to their chieftain by England excluded the hope of an asylum in Europe. This country furnished the sole desirable refuge. Joseph Bonaparte, the most compromised of the Emperor's brothers, set the example of flight to America. The story of his Bordentown residence is familiar history, but his summer home in the Adirondacks and his large proprietorship around Lake Diana produced more durable memorials. His acquisition of about 100,000 acres of New York territory enabled him to allot farms to a number of the old soldiers of his brother, and the memory of these settlements is perpetuated in the names of Lake Bonaparte and of the town of Elba.

It would require a volume to detail the leaven of merit and amenity which resulted from this substantial immigration of citizens of the most brilliant nation of the world into different sec-

tions of our country. Some of the more prominent Imperialists, such as Grouchy, Regnault, and Achille Murat, returned to France after the revolution of 1830, but leading civilians of that *régime* remained as permanent settlers and founded American families that have played and are still playing prominent parts in our public affairs. New Orleans was naturally a centre which would attract them. Indeed French military skill and courage did much to second Jackson's defence; the great Moreau had during a former visit sketched the plan of defence; Latour of the Polytechnic school constructed the engineering works that sheltered our sharpshooters; and Lefebvre served the mortars that pounded the attacking lines on the field of Chalmette. The soldiers of the Empire thus gave a further assurance of the title to the New France which had been conveyed to us twelve years before.

Still later, cavalry of the Guard, headed by the indomitable Lefebvre, founded the State of Marengo, in the Territory of Alabama, and appropriately called its capital the City of Eagles. Funds were raised in France to develop

the colony, and for a while the inhabitants seemed quite contented. But the drums of Marengo resounded in their ears, and beguiled them from the quietude of farming life. Many of the refugees settled in Mobile, and in the year of Napoleon's death, the spirit of his old retainers expired, and the sole survival of their refuge is now localized under the name of Demopolis, City of the People.

XVII

Arrangements in America for a Rescue from St. Helena

EVEN in "the last phase" our country sustained a certain association with the captive of St. Helena. The English felt that any danger of rescue would originate upon the western shore of the Atlantic. Admiral Cockburn occupied the neighbouring island of Ascension avowedly to prevent it falling into the hands of Yankee raiders. The feeling in the United States against England was at that time quite bitter. Napoleon's landing at St. Helena followed the battle

of New Orleans only about seven months, and the downfall of the revolutionary monarch aroused deep sympathy throughout the country.

But the actual grounds for believing in the existence of a rescue party and rescue plans in the United States, rest upon the movements of General Lallemant and his associates. This officer's military record, from the revolutionary days to Waterloo, had been distinguished by notable feats of daring. His devotion to the Emperor was loyal and persistent; he had followed him until his embarkation from the shores of France, and had tried in vain to accompany him to St. Helena. He was condemned to death by the reactionary tribunals of 1816, but had succeeded in escaping and joining his brother at Philadelphia. At this time our country was literally swarming with French military refugees, many of whom, like Lallemant, were under capital sentence for their conduct towards the Bourbons during the Hundred Days. The Lallemands proceeded ostensibly to unite a number of these veterans into a military colony, which they called the Field Asylum. Our government

granted them 100,000 acres on the banks of the Tombigby, but as their own project required their establishment near the sea, they sold the lands and with the proceeds settled on the Trinity river in Texas, about fifteen miles from its mouth. The second in command was Baron Rigaud, whose kindly feelings towards the *ancien régime* had been illustrated by publicly stamping the cross of St. Louis under his feet; needless to say he was also under sentence of death by Louis XVIII's court martial. But the best known of all this devoted band was the famous pirate Lafitte, who had begun life as a Bordeaux blacksmith—had killed his love rival in a duel—had become a noted corsair, the terror of the Antillean seas—had been the effective ally of General Jackson in repulsing the British at New Orleans—and at the time of the French settlement of old guardsmen in his vicinity, was established at Galveston.

This narrative does not require a detailed statement of the affairs of the four hundred grenadiers—of the attacks of the Mexicans on their camp—of their final removal to New Orleans.

All the circumstances indicate that it was not the intention of the Lallemands to found an agricultural colony, but to unite about one thousand old soldiers for the deliverance of the great prisoner. The location of their camp was favourable for the scheme, being near the sea, in an unsettled country where their movements would not be watched, and above all in proximity to Lafitte, who commanded the required ships. Besides these desirable vessels, another craft, a model of swiftness, was constructed at Charleston and equipped for its purpose in the most complete manner. An intrepid captain named Boissière, who navigated for pleasure, had accepted its command, and this was the ship destined to carry away Napoleon Bonaparte, while Lafitte would land the guardsmen and engage the attention of the English cruisers. The enterprise was known to the captives, as shown by Bertrand's disclosures. But when the preparations were about completed, the news arrived of the Emperor's death.

XVIII

*What Would Have Been the Nature of
Napoleon's Domicile in the United
States?*

THE questions surrounding Napoleon's residence in this country were not, however, so entirely simple in those perturbed times. That there was an element of international danger involved may be gathered from his own utterances on this subject: "From the American shores I could freely watch the changes in Europe and keep a check on events." From this language it is natural to infer that this country was regarded by him as a vantage point for effecting an easy return to France, should the course of political events favour another deposition of the Bourbons.

Napoleon's inability to dissociate the most pacific enterprise from its political effect is shown by his estimate of the manner in which he might utilize the large land purchase of his brother Joseph in northern New York:

"Its proximity to Canada would attract a large number of French Canadians. With our associates we could command one hundred millions of francs, and could gather sixty thousand people, the greater part having property, talent or instruction. The colony would be susceptible of wielding an anti-English influence."

Even this voice from St. Helena portended that regalities and international conflicts might arise from the recesses of the Adirondacks. After all it does not seem that the ex-Emperor was yet prepared for a pastoral life.

The thought of Napoleon Bonaparte in the United States strangely suggests his unique personality. We are accustomed to think of our country as spacious enough and our government as comprehensive enough to harbour and assimilate any individuality, as well as any multitude.

But in respect to the ex-Emperor there is an exceptional impression—as if he were something so abnormal, a personage so meteor-like—that our broad continent could find no abiding place for him, that our institutions could not adapt them-

selves to his installation. We cannot conceive that a being so dominant as to stride the European continent, to exceed the dominion of Charlemagne, could ever become a pacific individual, in our primitive surroundings. The setting in which we naturally place him is the America of the post-Waterloo days. And those times were shortly subsequent to the conspiracy of Burr, to the unsettlement of the regions on both sides of the Rocky Mountains. Would not these wild expanses have beckoned this turbulent spirit to a Latin Empire on the Pacific? We may recall the uneasiness caused by the landing in Manhattan of the retiring and suave ex-King of Spain, the refusal of the President to receive him, the sending of a Commissioner by our Government to investigate reported Napoleonic incursions into Mexico.

Far transcending these minor phases, with what enthusiasm would Americans have received the Little Corporal who had democratized royalty, who had overturned the thrones of Europe with the armies of our late and still cherished ally! But on sober second thought the feeling would recur

that Napoleon Bonaparte is the one human being to whom our Republic could not adapt itself. In activity we could not hold him, and in passivity we cannot think of him.

XIX

Napoleon's Estimate of Our National Characteristics

THE ideas of government which traversed the mind of Napoleon were the product of his study and experience. They belong to our purview only so far as they affected his opinions of the American experiment. The bitter personal humiliation which Bonaparte endured as a cadet and officer produced his antagonism of feeling towards the old *régime*. When he became a witness of the excesses of the reign of terror, his spirit of discipline repudiated such disorder, though his necessities compelled him to outward assent.

Concurrently with these experiences, his mental evolution as a politician may be scanned through his reading and compositions. The former included the pages of Rousseau, who devised

a much-canvassed plan of government for Corsica, and the writings of our regimental officer in the armies of the revolution unquestionably embraced republican doctrine.

But the key-note of Napoleon's views of government is the historical principle. As a student of the recorded affairs of nations, he tested the value of political theories by their actual working at various times and places. Only enough need be stated on this subject to indicate that his outlook was sufficiently comprehensive to include a sincere admiration for the scheme of popular self-government which had been established in this country.

We subjoin an appreciation in his own words:

"It is an immense continent abounding in liberty of a very special nature. If you are melancholy, you can jump into a carriage, drive one thousand leagues, and enjoy constantly the pleasure of a simple traveller. You are the equal of everybody. You can lose yourself at will in the crowd, without any annoyances, and retaining one's manners, language and religion."

The reference to our physical expanse comes with peculiar grace from the transferrer of the Louisiana Territory. The enjoyment of civil liberty in our midst is tersely described. The social tolerance of other nationalities may be open to more question; though the memory of the French alliance, and the sympathy with her republican struggles, ensured special cordiality towards her sons.

Perhaps his broadest philosophical estimate of American institutions is contained in this calm summing-up at St. Helena.

“See how everything prospers in the United States. How happy and tranquil is every one! The reason is that the interest of the public is the controlling influence. Place the same government in hostility with the general interest, and you would see the disturbances, the troubles, and the confusion which would ensue.”

This is a clear presentation of the advantage of unity among the rulers and the ruled; of its tendency towards the attainment of public quietude and its sequence in pub-

lic prosperity. In short he foreshadows his total conviction in reference to governments—that their form is not so material as their unison with the practical requirements of the governed.

Napoleon's estimate of the outcome of our democratic government, operating upon such a large territorial scale, coincides with the views of other and much later statesmen. When the cession of Louisiana was criticized as productive of too much aggregation of power, the First Consul remarked:

“If America may be found too powerful for Europe, we may look for dissensions in the bosom of the Union. Confederations called perfect only endure until one of the parties to the contract finds reason to break it.”

While our Civil War may partially justify this prediction, our triumphant national cohesion has rejected the final judgment.

There was a period when Napoleon thought that our administration was weak in working power. Those were the years when “England was treating us as if we were still her subjects”—

searching our vessels, and imposing a species of international navigation act, in restriction of our trade. It was then Napoleon declared: "They need a ten years' war to make them a nation. By that war they would acquire a noblesse, which they lack, as they are now only a nation of merchants." As we did soon engage in a three years' war with England, there was some foundation for the comment on our ante-bellum course. The call upon us for some higher spirit than the mere commercial instinct is reflected in the demand for an American nobility—a nobility of character. By our great Civil War we have redeemed all these requirements, we have shown the highest infusion of a national ideal. But he was mistaken in supposing that such a military development would produce Marshals, or knights of a Legion of Honour, or that such a noblesse as he created would be needed to maintain the vitality of the American spirit. With his historical sense, he was apparently right in supposing it was needed in France.

XX

The Influence of Napoleon on American History

THE most apparent topic in this connection is the effect of the Louisiana purchase upon the development of our country. But that theme is worthy of separate historical treatment. The alternative to that purchase was the English conquest of this French territory, which suggestion opens an extensive field of speculation with reference to the future of the United States. We are more concerned with less familiar-and less uncertain incidents.

From an economic point of view, the Napoleonic wars exerted an important influence over the United States. They occasioned an early and marked development of our manufacturing industries. The embargoes which were placed on New England shipping diverted the energies of the Eastern states to mechanical pursuits. While the various non-intercourse measures confined our merchant marine to the home ports, the spindles

in the cotton mills of New England were increased in two years from eight thousand to eighty thousand. And other Yankee industries were enlarged in like proportions, so that the whole country was soon supplied with clothing, linens, boots and hats from Massachusetts and Connecticut. While our vessels were withdrawn from activity, on account of Napoleon's interference with the free course of our carrying trade, we thus had recourse to manufacturing; which then received an impetus subsequently leading to its enormous achievements.

From a political aspect, Napoleon's influence on this country, though more indirect, was equally important. It is well known that our party divisions at this early period of our history were largely influenced by sympathy with our late ally, or our late enemy. The excesses of the French revolution had repelled many of its republican friends in this country. This feeling aided in sustaining the Federalist party in power. But the later identification of republicanism with the successes of Napoleon, and the predominance of France, assisted the Jeffersonians in securing

control of the Union government. The subsequent war with England emphasized this changed political feeling in the States. After Waterloo the absolutist *régime* which prevailed over the continent reacted in this country to the point of intensity. Those conditions were reflected in the design of the Holy Alliance to repress republican outbreaks in South America, and its counterblast in the Monroe doctrine. This sequence of events contributed to the long lease of power held by the democratic party, with all its course of influence upon our political development down to the time of the civil war.

XXI

American Opinion of the Emperor

WHAT is the judgment of America, upon Napoleon Bonaparte, as a public man? Properly, to summarize this opinion, it should be adjusted to the angle of the situations which Napoleon had to meet. From this standpoint, a President of the United States has furnished us with a

verdict. When Grouchy visited John Quincy Adams, after the Emperor's death, the President said to him: "You have not understood the Emperor. Washington placed like the Emperor Napoleon would have done like him." This remark implies that the conduct of French internal and external affairs would have involved a man of the self-denying character of Washington within the same practical limitations and would have resulted in his acceptance of the same opportunist conclusions as those adopted by Napoleon. The difference of environment makes a solution of the question almost unthinkable. As to the internal affairs of France, it may, however, be reasonably predicated of Washington that he would have made a forcible Consul—that he would have curbed the anarchic elements and maintained order. Also it may be noted that Washington began his career as an Imperialist, when he aided Great Britain in the effort to wrest the Ohio Valley from French domination. On the same lines, if the colonies had remained colonial a few years longer, it is logical that Washington would have led an army under the Union Jack to the con-

quest of the Western country. But even on the line of such analogies, it is indeed a fruitless speculation to follow President Adams' suggestion—to calculate what a measured Anglo-Saxon would have done in the place of a Corsican-Italian and in the face of monarchic Europe.

This topic does, however, acquire a peculiar interest from Napoleon's own expressions in reference to these current comparisons or contrasts with the great American.

“When I reached power, some wished that I should be a Washington. Words cost nothing, and assuredly, those who so smoothly uttered that wish did so without knowledge of time, the place, men, and circumstance. If I had been in America I would willingly have been content to play the part of Washington, and I should have merited little credit, for I do not see how it would have been reasonably possible to play another rôle. But if Washington had found himself in France, with disintegration going on within and invasion menacing from without, I would have defied Washington

to be himself, or if he had tried to be so, he would have been nothing but a fool. As for myself, I had to be no more, no less, than a crowned Washington."

It would be futile to add anything to this analysis of the controversy.

XXII

Napoleon as a Propagandist of American Ideas

IT may be more useful to consider the extent of Napoleon's services in spreading our political principles over the old continent. With the French administration extending from Holland to Naples, and the French armies encamped for nearly ten years between the Rhine and the Oder, between the Baltic and the Adriatic, what were the enduring results of those efforts from an historic point of view? First and foremost the idea of equality before the law was visibly spread over continental Europe. The proclamations of Bonaparte evidence this apostolate. At that time this propaganda was the first necessary step in

